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Abstract
This paper investigates optimal indexation in the New Keynesian model, when the indexation
choice includes the possibility of partial indexation and of varying weights on rational and lagged
indexation. It nds that the Calvo contract adjusted for rationally expected indexation under both
ination and price level targeting regimes delivers the highest expected welfare under both restricted
and full current information. Rational indexation eliminates the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy on
welfare when there is only price-level targeting under the current micro information. If including both
wage setting and full current information, monetary policy is e¤ective; and a price-level targeting
rule delivers the highest benets because it minimises the size of shocks to prices and thus dispersion.
However, even less than full rational indexation ensures that there is very little nominal rigidity in
the adapted world of Calvo contracts.
Keywords: optimal indexation, price-level target, ination target, Calvo contracts, rational ex-
pectation, New Keynesian model.
JEL codes: E50, E52
1 Introduction
In a previous paper (Le and Minford, 2006) we showed that within the New Keynesian Model in the
presence of monetary noise, the Calvo contract should be indexed for rationally expected (rational
indexation) rather than lagged ination (lagged indexation), even though the latter is widely used in
the literature to protect both wages and prices against movements in the general price level (Erceg et
al., 2000; Christiano et al., 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2002; and Giannoni and Woodford, 2003b). That
paper addressed the special case of full indexation, either rational or lagged, for both prices and wages
under a now-standard central bank interest rate rule targeting ination. In this paper, we broaden the
analysis, based on the same New Keynesian model, and investigate the more general question of optimal
indexation when the indexation choice includes the possibility of partial indexation and of varying weights
on rational and lagged indexation. We also attempt to establish how this optimising choice would respond
to the nature of monetary policy, which we restrict in the New Keynesian manner to an interest rate
rule and a choice between ination and price-level targeting. Finally we explore the implications for the
choice of monetary target.
Some will reject our agenda on empirical grounds, arguing that the Calvo model with lagged in-
dexation when accompanied by other model features ts the facts of impulse responses as suggested by
Christiano, et al (2005). Clearly empirical issues are another matter entirely, not pursued here. Our sole
purpose in this paper is theoretical, to nd the indexation mechanism that maximises consumer welfare
and to discover its implications. Nevertheless we caution against the assumption that the empirical issue
is closed in this way: recent work on UK data (Minford, 2006) suggests that models with little or no
nominal rigidity, as occurs under rational indexing with the Calvo model here, are rather successful in
replicating impulse responses in the data when the model itself is used for identication1 .
We proceed as follows.After a brief section on previous related work, we rst consider a world in
which the current information available to agents who are setting prices or wages is solely about their
own situation (microinformation); this boils down to them observing their own productivity shock if
they are a price-setter (if they are a wage setter they would observe only their own current preference
shocks but these are suppressed in this model). Thus in this world there is a lag before agents see the
1Preliminary results from VARs on US data (H-P-ltered or di¤erenced) also suggest that, when identied by a model
without nominal rigidity as the one here, the impulse responses in the data are not greatly at variance with the model
impulse responses discussed below.
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current macro outcome. We consider the implications of this world rst in a linearised model with a
exible labour market, a xed capital stock and price-setting and secondly in a full nonlinear model with
investment and wage-setting added in.
Secondly we relax this information assumption and allow agents to observe all current information
while they are setting prices or wages; this might occur if statistics are released rapidly or there is very
e¢ cient signal extraction from global indicators like interest rates, especially in the context of quarterly
data which is our prime frame of reference. We then revisit both our linearised and our full models under
this relaxed information assumption.
1.1 Previous work:
Minford, Nowell and Webb (2003); and Minford and Nowell (2003) look at wage contracts in an over-
lapping contracts model. In the former, they showed that contracts respond to monetary policy. The
greater the persistence in shocks, the higher is indexation. The reason is that shocks would disturb prices
and if they are temporary, then indexation is unhelpful, because by the time the indexation element has
been spent, the shock would have disappeared. However, if the shock is permanent, indexation can be
used to o¤set the shocks e¤ect on consumption. In the second paper, they expand the issue to con-
sider the interplay of endogenous indexation and optimal monetary policy. They found that price-level
rules improved welfare compared with ination targeting rules, and in so doing reduced the degree of
indexation dramatically.
These papers built on earlier work that focused on the appropriate rate of indexation in contracts
going back to Gray (1976) and Fisher (1977) (see also Barros critique, 1977). Using the idea that labour
contracts could act as insurance for workers (e.g. Azariadis, 1975, and Baily, 1974, and see Malcomson,
1999, for a review of the contract literature) they argued that wages would not be fully indexed because
it was not feasible to draw up a fully-contingent contract, expressed throughout in real terms; hence a
partial indexation parameter would stand in as a contingent response to shocks.
Ination targeting is attractive in New Keynesian models because with sticky prices variable ination
causes misallocation of resources between rms that can adjust prices and rms that cannot (Carlstrom
and Fuerst, 2002). Thus ination targeting reduces the ine¢ ciencies associated with sticky prices. But
can we do better than this? Theoretically, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2002) suggest that price targeting rules
may be generally better than ination targeting rules because they build in a backward-looking element
to avoid the possibility of sunspot events2 that can happen under ination targeting. Under an ination
target, past ination misses do not a¤ect future policy actions: there is base drift. But with a price level
target, past misses must a¤ect future policy actions because the monetary policy must get the price back
to the path, so there is no base drift. In time series language price level would be I(0) whereas under
ination targeting it is I(1) (implying that the variance surrounding future prices rises the further in the
future one looks).
There could be other reasons to have a stationary price level.
Under an ination targeting regime the uncertainty surrounding the future price level a¤ects the
issuing of long-term bonds and wage contracts. In principle indexation can allow people to deal with real
variables directly, avoiding nominal contracts. But in practice indexation is imperfect, both in timing
and in exactness- Minford (2006).
Moreover, there is the practical question of the zero bound on nominal interest rates. Nowadays,
when ination is low, it has worried central banks that a serious recession could require large interest
rate cuts, but the interest rate cannot go below zero at which the demand for money is indeterminate,
and therefore monetary policy cannot help the economy to recover. The problem is worse if prices are
falling, since then at the zero bound real interest rates remain positive. This concern has led policy-
makers to set ination targets away from zero to create room for interest to fall if it needs to (Minford,
2006). However, price level targeting creates an automatic expectation of future ination when prices
fall, so lowering the real interest rates in a deation; this could help to alleviate the zero bound.
There has been concern that price level targeting may create macroeconomic instability. Svensson
(1999a) noted the consensus of earlier authors (Hall, 1984; Duguay, 1994; Bank of Canada, 1994; Fischer,
1994) that monetary policy should target prices rather ination. This lowers long-term price variance at
2Central banks base their policy changes on ination projections. Then money supply can be adjusted passively by
the monetary authority - supplied at whatever level is necessary to achieve the target. Changes in the money supply can
be self-fullling because public decisions depend on what the public is expected to do, and the public, in turn, bases its
behaviour on monetary actions, and there is nothing to pin down either. To avoid sunspot events, options include: a
constant money growth rule; aggressive changes in interest rates in response to ination; or basing the bulk of the response
on past ination, as in price level targeting (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2002)
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the expense of higher short-term ination and output variance. He wrote: The intuition is straightfor-
ward: in order to stabilise the price level under price-level targeting, higher-than-average ination must
be succeeded by lower-than average-ination, higher ination variability via nominal rigidities would
then seem to result in higher output variability. However, he pointed out that the consensus might
be wrong. Given a persistent output gap, focusing on the price level rather than the ination rate will
actually reduce both ination and output variability under discretionary policy- in the absence therefore
of commitment.
Other authors have examined optimal monetary policy under commitment. For example, Smets
(2000) uses a model with a Calvo-style Phillips Curve to examine the optimal horizon for bringing
ination or the price level back to their targets; he nds that optimal length becomes shorter the more
forward-looking are price expectations and the steeper is the Phillips Curve. Williams (1999) evaluates
a variety of rules in the FRB model in which there is a forward/backward-looking Phillips Curve and
inertial pricing dynamics and nds that multi-period ination targeting ranks highly and that price level
targeting only causes minor output instability. In this commitment context, price level targeting with
a suitably long horizon has little e¤ect on the optimal trade-o¤, and so the long-run price level can be
a anchor for policy makers. Chadha and Nolan (2002) too compare ination and price level targeting
in New Keynesian models without indexation. They show that price level targeting dominates ination
targeting under credible commitment and with su¢ cient ination aversion, the ination-targeting central
bank can produce quantitatively similar results to one targeting the price level.
Here we assume full commitment to the interest rate rule in line with New Keynesian models generally;
we also ignore the zero bound issue and assume no sunspots. Indexation operates with a one period lag.
Thus our aim is to extend the standard New Keynesian approach to deal with the best feasible indexation.
2 RESULTS WHEN AGENTS ONLY OBSERVE MICRO IN-
FORMATION
2.1 The linearised model with price setters only and xed capital
In our earlier paper we set out the New Keynesian model (Canzoneri et al, 2004) characterised by
optimising agents, monopolistic competition, staggered wage and price setting, capital formation and
an interest rate rule, together with the addition of indexing prices and wages. In the earlier paper, we
found that indexation should be rationally expected ination, because it optimises the welfare of the
representative agent in the model. It was shown analytically that as the consequence of such indexation
monetary policy no longer has any e¤ect on welfare. In this paper, we allow price- and wage-setters
to choose the optimal indexation from a linear combination of lagged ination and rationally expected
ination. This can be either partial or full indexation.
We provide a listing of the full nonlinear model in the Appendix 5:1. The following lists the linearised
equations (For the detailed derivation of the equations, see Le and Minford, 2006). It is assumed
that capital is exogenous and made a non-tradeable endowment resource, while the labour market is
competitive. In order the equations are:
Real marginal cost
logmct = logMCt   logPt = logWt   logPt +  logNt   logZt (1)
The production function
log Yt = logZt + (1  ) logNt (2)
Ignoring government spending, the market clearing condition gives
log Yt = logCt (3)
An interest rate rule, without lags and with the real interest rate assumed to be set in response to
ination and the output gap, with a monetary shock:
rt = t + (log Yt   logZt) + logMt (4)
or with the real interest rate, reacting to price level and output gap, with a monetary shock
rt =  logPt + (log Yt   logZt) + logMt (5)
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Note that these can identically be written as rules for the nominal interest rate using it = rt+Ett+1.
Note also that we treat the monetary authorities as having e¤ective full current information; this is the
standard assumption made in New Keynesian models, presumably on the grounds that the authorities
in practice have good access to information about the current state of the economy, even if the isolated
private agent does not as we initially assume here.
Adding in the Euler equation logCt = logCt+1   rt and allowing for market clearing gives us an
Aggregate Demand curve:
log Yt =
1
1  B 1 f 
t +  logZt    logMtg (6)
or
log Yt =
1
1  B 1 f 
 logPt +  logZt    logMtg (7)
where logZt = 1 logZt 1 + zt; logMt = 2 logMt 1 + t; zt and t are i:i:d.; B
 1 is the forward
operator instructing one to lead the variable but keeping the expectations data-set constant;  = 11+ :
The new reset price
logP t =
1  
1  B 1Et

1 + 
1   (log Yt   logZt) + logPt   log
~Pt

(8)
The general price level
logPt   log ~Pt = 

logPt 1   log ~Pt 1

+ (1  ) logP t (9)
and the price indexation formula is log ~Pt = k0
 
Et 1 logPt + k1
 
logPt 1   Et 1 logPt

, where
k0 2 [0; 1] and k1 2 [0; 1]. If k0 = 1; then prices are fully indexed; and if k0 = 0; then price is not
indexed. If k1 = 1;then prices are indexed to the lagged price level; and if k1 = 0; then they are indexed
to rationally expected general price level.
Price dispersion is
logDPt =
1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  )  logP t i2 (10)
 1j=01i=0pi+j (1  )2 logP t i logP t j
In order to discuss policy within the context of this model, we evaluate expected welfare in terms of
its deviation from the ex-price optimum
E
 
ut   uFLEXt

=  E logDPt =  1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  ) var  logP t i (11)
+1j=0
1
i=0p
i+j (1  )2 Cov  logP t i; logP t j
where uFLEXt = logZt under the exible price and wage assumption.
2.2 Solving the model with restricted private information
Our notation is as follows: Et 1xt = E (xt j t 1) ;Etxt = E (xt j t 1; t) ;xUEt = xt   Et 1xt; where
t 1 is the full information set from period t 1 and t is the limited information set available for period
t: The plan of this section for solving the model under both price-level targeting and ination targeting
is (a) Solve for the price level logPt using the Wold decomposition; (b) Solve for the reset price level
logP t using unknown parameters that were determined in (a); (c) Using (b) to nd the covariances and
variances of reset prices, which in turn contribute to the calculation of the expected price dispersion; (d)
Expected welfare is the negative of expected price dispersion.
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2.2.1 Ination targeting rule
Here we consider the case of an interest rule that targets the ination rate (at zero for convenience). To
begin, we use equations (6), (9), (8), indexation formula and the assumption that rms have knowledge of
their own micro information (productivity, prices and costs) in period t as well as the macro information
of period (t  1) to express all price related variables in terms of the future expected monetary and real
shocks (for more details, see Appendix 5:2):
(1  ) logP t = logPt   k0

Et 1 logPt + k1
 
logPt 1   Et 1 logPt
 
 logPt 1   k0 Et 2 logPt 1 + k1  logPt 2   Et 2 logPt 1	
=
(1  ) (1  )
1  B 1 Et
8<: 1+1 

1
1 B 1
   logPt +  logPt 1
+ logZt    logMt

  logZt

+ logPt   k0

Et 1 logPt + k1
 
logPt 1   Et 1 logPt

9=;(12)
Collecting terms and converting the operators back into leads and lags, we obtain
logPt   (2:5847 + 1:9028k0k1) logPt 1 +

1:8945  0:88889k0
+2:69k0k1

Et 1 logPt  
  (1:75 + 3:1528k0k1   1:4915k0)Et 2 logPt 1 + (1:534 + 2:43k0k1) logPt 2
 0:62k0k1 logPt 3   0:62k0 (1  k1)Et 3 logPt 2 + 0:936k0 (1  k1)Et 3 logPt 1
+0:564 (1  k0 + k0k1)Et 1 logPt+2   (1:8  1:42k0 + 1:98k0k1)Et 1 logPt+1
+(1:6604  2:32k0 + 2:842k0k1)Et 2 logPt
 0:351k0 (1  k1)Et 3 logPt + ( 0:521 + 0:901k0   0:901k0k1)Et 2 logPt+1
= 

(1   1)
 
zt   21 ( +    1) zt 1
  2 (1  1) (1  1)t 1 (13)
Given the assumption that logPt = 1i=0"izt i+
1
i=0&it i; equation (13) can hold if and only if the
sum of the LHSs and the RHSs coe¢ cients on zt, on zt 1, on zt 2:::; are equal respectively (and the
same argument for t i). For example these coe¢ cients on the zt i must satisfy (Appendix 5:2 shows
the equivalent for the t i:)
(zt)
"0 = 
 (1   1) (14)
(zt 1)
0:564 (1  k0 + k0k1) "3 + ( 1:8 + 1:42k0   1:98k0k1) "2+
(2:8945  0:88889k0 + 2:69k0k1) "1   (2:5847 + 1:9028k0k1) "0
=   (1   1) 21 ( +    1)
(15)
(zt 2)
0:564 (1  k0 + k0k1) "4   (2:321  2:322k0 + 2:881k0k1) "3
+(4:5549  3:2089k0 + 5:532k0k1) "2
+( 4:3347 + 1:4915k0   5:0556k0k1) "1 + (1:534 + 2:43k0k1) "0 = 0
(16)
(zt i; i  3)
0:564 (1  k0 + k0k1) "i+2   (2:321  2:322k0 + 2:881k0k1) "i+1+
(4:5549  3:56k0 + 5:883k0k1) "i   (4:3347  2:4275k0 + 6k0k1) "i 1+
(1:534  0:62k0 + 3:05k0k1) "i 2   0:62k0k1"i 3 = 0
(17)
The last equation is a 5th order di¤erence equation under the real shocks and it is identical to the
equation (38) in Appendix 5:2, illustrating the case of monetary shocks. Thus both equations (17) and
(38) are characterised by the 5th order polynomial equation
5
0 = 0:564 (1  k0 + k0k1)x5   (2:321  2:322k0 + 2:881k0k1)x4 +
(4:5549  3:56k0 + 5:883k0k1)x3 + ( 4:3347 + 2:4275k0   6k0k1)x2
+(1:534  0:62k0 + 3:05k0k1)x  0:62k0k1 (18)
We consider all possible combinations of k0 and k1 and nd stable roots under each combination3 .
In this 5th order di¤erence equation, the number of forward roots is two; therefore the condition for
a unique saddle path is two unstable roots (looking backwards). The problem, however, is that many
(k0; k1) yield the wrong number of unstable roots. Many yield three which implies an overdetermined
solution; some only have one which implies nonuniqueness. So we only report the cases that deliver
the unique solution. In general, these cases will give three stable roots, called x1; x2; and x3; thus, the
equation (18) can be reduced to
(1  x1L) (1  x2L) (1  x3L) "i = 0
and (1  x1L) (1  x2L) (1  x3L) &i = 0 for i  3 (19)
for real and monetary shocks respectively. That is
"i   (x1 + x2 + x3) "i 1 + (x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3) "i 2 + x1x2x3"t 3 = 0
and &i   (x1 + x2 + x3) &i 1 + (x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3) &i 2 + x1x2x3&i 3 = 0 for i  3 (20)
The values of x1; x2; and x3 under each combination of (k0; k1) are derived numerically. Table (1)
reports the values of x1 and values of
p
x2  x3 for all combinations of k0 and k1 that give a stable
solution path (except the case of (1; 0), which will be described separately- Appendix 5:3)
(k0;k1) combination x1 damping factor (
p
x2  x3)
(0; all) 0 0:932623
(1; 0:2) 0:10047 0:947849
(1; 0:4) 0:16347 0:931673
(1:0:6) 0:20892 0:925109
(1; 0:8) 0:24552 0:953922
(1; 1) 0:2744 0:945944
Table 1: Values of stable roots under ination targeting
From equations (14), (15), (16), (20) and results in Table (1), we can build the system of equations
and solve for "i under di¤erent combinations of (k0; k1) to get the solution for the real shocks related
part of the price level logPt = 1i=0"izt i:While from the equations in Appendix 5:2, (20) and results in
Table (1) ; we nd &i that gives the part of price which relates to monetary shocks logPt = 1i=0&it i.
However, in order to nd the expected welfare, logP t must be written in terms of these unknown
coe¢ cients (the working is shown in Appendix 6:4):
logP t (zt i) =
 0zt + 0zt 1
1   +
 k0k1 ("0   "1) + (1  k0) "1
1   zt 1 +
"2 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  "1 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1"0
1   zt 2 +
"3 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  "2 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1"1
1   zt 3 + ::: (21)
and
logP t
 
t i

=
 k0k1 (&0   &1) + (1  k0) &1
1   t 1 +
&2 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  &1 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1&0
1   t 2 +
&3 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  &2 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1&1
1   t 3 + ::: (22)
3k0 = 0 : 0:2 : 1 and k1 = 0 : 0:2 : 1
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To calculate the expected price dispersion
E logDPt =
1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  )V ar  logP t i
 1j=01i=0pi+j (1  )2 Cov(logP t i; logP t j);
we need to nd two components. One is the covariance which arises because of lagged terms being
cross-multiplied; these terms are then the variance of the i:i:d: error times the various cross-terms. The
other is the variance. We only demonstrate the calculation of these two terms under productivity shocks.
The analysis under monetary shocks is analogous.
Covariance First, we write equation (21) as
logP t (zt i) = a0zt + a1zt 1 + a2zt 2 + a3zt 3 + a4zt 4 + ::: (23)
where
a0 =
 0
1   =  
00
a1 =

0
1   +
 k0k1 ("0   "1) + (1  k0) "1
1  
a2 =
"2 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  "1 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1"0
1   ; etc:
Second, the covariances under productivity shocks will be, for example
Cov(logP t ; logP

t 1) = var(z) [a0a1 + a1a2 + a2a3 + a3a4 + a4a5 + a5a6 + :::]
Cov(logP t ; logP

t 2) = var(z) [a0a2 + a1a3 + a2a4 + a3a5 + a4a6 + a5a7 + :::]
Cov(logP t ; logP

t 3) = var(z) [a0a3 + a1a4 + a2a5 + a3a6 + a4a7 + a5a8 + :::] ; etc: (24)
The rst few cross-terms of these covariances can be calculated explicitly, however, ai would decay
after a certain point at the rate of the dominant root, called , of the three stable roots. This allows us
to write the equations in (24) as
Cov(logP t ; logP

t 1) = var(z)

a0a1 + a1a2 + a2a3 + a3a4 + a4a5 + a
2
5 + :::

Cov(logP t ; logP

t 2) = var(z)

a0a2 + a1a3 + a2a4 + a3a5 + a4a5 + 
2a25 + :::

Cov(logP t ; logP

t 3) = var(z)

a0a3 + a1a4 + a2a5 + a3a5 + 
2a4a5 + 
3a25 + 
3a26 + :::

etc: (25)
Therefore,
 1j=01i=0Cov(logP t ; logP t i) =
 pvar(z)
1 + 
26664

1 
 
a25 + a
2
6 + :::

+ a0

a1 + a2 + :::+
a5
1 

+a1

a2 + :::+
a5
1 

+ a2

a3 + :::+
a5
1 

+
a3

a4 +
a5
1 

+ a4
a5
1 
37775
(26)
Variance The second term in the expected price dispersion formula- variance- is calculated as follows:
V ar(logP t ) = var(z)(a
2
0 + a
2
1 + a
2
2 + a
2
3 + a
2
4 + :::) (27)
and
1
2
1i=0p
i (1  ) 1  i (1  )V ar  logP t i = pvar(z)1 +  (a20 + a21 + a22 + a23 + a24 + :::)
From this point onwards, all calculation for both variance and covariance components is done numer-
ically.
Table (2) shows the results of expected welfare under di¤erent combinations of (k0; k1) :
7
k0 k1 E(DP)prod E(DP)money E(DP) E(Welfare)
0 0 0:011969955  0:000499815 0:011470141  0:011470141
1 0 0:01006 0 0:01006  0:01006
1 0:2 0:012759147  1:24008E   05 0:012746747  0:012746747
1 0:4 0:012760009  1:706E   05 0:012742949  0:012742949
1 0:6 0:012762261  2:74937E   05 0:012734767  0:012734767
1 0:8 0:012770473  0:000117127 0:012653346  0:012653346
1 1 0:012771709  0:00014718 0:012624529  0:012624529
Table 2: Expected welfare under interest rate rule targeting zero rate ination
2.2.2 Price targeting rule
Here the analysis is analogous to the one used above for the ination target regime.Using equations
(7), (8), (9), the indexation formula and the assumption that rms have knowledge of their own micro
information (productivity, prices and costs) in period t as well as the macro information of period (t  1) ;
we write all the terms related to the price level as a function of real and monetary shocks. The results
are identical to those for ination targets under full rational indexation which is again the optimum.
Again, monetary policy is impotent in this case.
We obtain the equivalent results to those of ination targeting in the two following Tables 2 and 4:
(k0;k1) combination x1 damping factor (
p
x2  x3)
(0; all) 0 0:49174
(1; 0:2) 0:88303 0:29339
(1; 0:4) 0:85953 0:36410
(1:0:6) 0:93064 0:40279
(1; 0:8) 0:90543 0:43374
(1; 1) 0:88844 0:45787
Table 3: Values of stable roots under price level targetingl
k0 k1 E(DP)prod E(DP)money E(DP) E(Welfare)
0 0 0:012428407  1:59348E   05 0:012412473  0:012412473
1 0 0:01006 0 0:01006  0:01006
1 0:2 0:012840236 6:59E   07 0:012840895  0:012840895
1 0:4 0:012898353 2:25E   06 0:012900605  0:012900605
1 0:6 0:012941003 5:27E   06 0:012946275  0:012946275
1 0:8 0:012971234 7:67E   06 0:012978903  0:012978903
1 1 0:012991178 1:09E   05 0:013002112  0:013002112
Table 4: Expected welfare under interest rate rule targeting price level
2.3 Conclusion from the analytic with restricted private information
Under both type of monetary regime: interest rate rule with ination target and price level target, the
analytic model shows that overall the fully rational indexation for prices is always optimal. This is a
conrmation of the result that was derived in our previous paper for the more restricted comparison of
full rational with full lagged indexation. If agents index prices and wages rationally, expected welfare is
independent of the choice of monetary policy target under the assumption of micro current information.
The reason is that by allowing for rational indexation the New Keynesian Phillips Curve defaults to a
New Classical one, where real output only depends on current and lagged real shocks and the monetary
surprise, but not on the systematic part of the monetary rule. This is an echo of Sargent and Wallaces
(1975) famous irrelevance result. The intuition is that rational indexation builds into prices the e¤ect of
any shocks known at time t 1. Whatever has happened at t 1 is, in the case of the productivity shock,
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built into the expected real reset price for the next period t; this xes expected real marginal cost and
hence expected real output. The expected price index is then calculated as the necessary price increase
that will accommodate this and the expected level of interest rates. Unexpected monetary shocks have
no e¤ect on prices because they have been pre-set in this way. Thus only lagged money shocks a¤ect
prices while only unexpected monetary shocks a¤ect output under rational indexation in this model.
Hence with this model the monetary rule has no impact on welfare when current information is solely
micro. We now turn to the full model under the same information assumption.
2.4 Stochastic simulation results on the full model under micro private in-
formation
We proceed to consider the stochastic simulations for expected welfare in terms of deviations from the
ex-optimum under both lagged and rational indexation when only micro information is assumed to be
known at period t. The aim is to relate these results to those from the analytic model above. Table (5)
shows that expected welfare is maximised by rational indexation, just as in the analytic model.
Type of shock k0 kw0 k1 kw1 Welfare
Ination target Mixed
0
0
:2
1
0
0
:2
1
1
:8
1
1
1
:8
1
1
 0:0048
 0:01311
 0:01626
 0:02669
Price target Mixed
0
0
:2
1
0
0
:2
1
1
:8
1
1
1
:8
1
1
 0:0048
 0:01032
 0:01120
 0:01994
Table 5: Expected welfare for di¤erent types of indexation assuming only current information is micro;
interest rule with ination and price level targets (stochastic simulation of monetary and productitivty
shocks, each with standard error of 0.01)
We now nd that monetary policy does, strictly speaking, have an e¤ect on expected welfare under
rational indexation. The reason for this is the introduction of wage-setting. Though prices are only
a¤ected by the productivity shock (because it alone is currently observed), the interest rate rule reacts
to both ination (or prices) and to the output gap while monetary shocks also a¤ect the latter. This
reaction alters output and so employment; with wages xed this drives agents away from their ex-price
leisure choice, a¤ecting their welfare. We also show in Table (6) how monetary policy choices a¤ect
expected welfare. The choice of whether to target ination or prices is irrelevant since it is only the
current price shock reaction that matters. Thus what matters in the interest rate rule is the size of
the reactions to ination or prices and to the output gap. Higher ination or price coe¢ cients worsen
the e¤ect of productivity shocks because they dampen price changes which means that real wages do
not change as much as they should to match productivity change. Higher reactions to the output gap
dampen movements in it and employment which move workers away from their ex-price choices. What
we notice is that while there are e¤ects here, they are not at all big, because the utility function does
not have much curvature in leisure. In the Calvo model the big losses arise because of price and wage
dispersion. Hence we can say that e¤ectively the results are the same as in the analytic model: full
rational indexation is optimal and in this case monetary policy is (e¤ectively) impotent.
Full Rational indexing Productivity Monetary Total
Ination targeting  0:00381  0:00098  0:0048
Price targeting  0:00381  0:00098  0:0048
Stricter Ination targeting  0:00426  0:00098  0:00524
Stricter Price targeting  0:00426  0:00098  0:00524
Ination targeting (higher weight on output gap)  0:00376  0:00092  0:00468
Price targeting (higher weight on output gap)  0:00376  0:00092  0:00468
Table 6: Expected welfare for di¤erent types of indexation assuming only current information is micro;
interest rule with ination and price level targets (stochastic simulation of monetary and productitivity
shocks, each with standard error of 0.01).
9
2.5 Conclusions on case of micro current information only
What we have found in this case is that full rational indexation is the dominant strategy for private
agents. This has strong implications for monetary policy. First, it is irrelevant whether the interest
rate rule targets ination or prices since only the shock to prices or ination matters and it is the same
under both rules. Second, the coe¢ cients of the rule make no di¤erence at all to expected welfare in
the analytic model (because current prices respond to current productivity shocks only) and in the full
model they make virtually no di¤erence (since they only enter through the e¤ect on employment whose
e¤ect on welfare is minor).
3 RESULTS WHEN AGENTS OBSERVE FULL CURRENT
INFORMATION
We now turn to the case where full current information is available to private agents. This is the default
assumption made in New Keynesian models. As we noted earlier the justication presumably lies in the
overlap between the length of time in which prices and wages are not changed at all- a quarter- and the
production of current macro information by statistics o¢ ces and the private sector itself. In the course
of three months price and wage setters may well be fairly well informed about what is going on in that
quarter so that the assumption of full knowledge may be a close approximation. At any rate we now
explore the implications of this assumption within the full model. Under full information the analytic
model becomes too complex to solve under indexation schemes which vary the weights on lagged and
rational indexation; we conne ourselves to some insights from the analytic model as far as we can take
it.
We check the stochastic simulation under the assumption of full information being available in period
t (Table 7). The pair (k0; kw0) show the weights on lagged and rational indexation in indexation
formulas for prices and wages respectively, while (k1; kw1) shows whether prices and wages are partially
or fully indexed. Our stochastic simulations are done for 100 sets of 40 overlapping shocks- with both
productivity and monetary shocks. Similarly to Minford and Nowell (2003), we treat each period outcome
as a stochastic experiment of equal likelihood. We ignore the discount rate in calculation of the expected
welfare. Firstly, in each set, in the rst period, it runs for the rst shock and records the welfare of this
period. The rst period values are then used as the base values for the next period simulation and so on.
Then.we have 4000 observations which we average to get expected welfare. This process repeats for each
(k0; kw0; k1; kw1), where values of these parameters all belong to the interval of [0; 1] and they move
with a step of 0:2: Finally, we compare all the expected welfare values to nd the weighting scheme that
gives the maximum expected welfare.
Table (7) reports the results of stochastic simulations on the full model, showing the optimal index-
ation scheme under our two shocks to productivity and money.
k0 kw0 k1 kw1 Best expected welfare
Ination targeting 0 0 1 1  0:00572
Price targeting 0 0 0:8 1  0:00096
Stricter price target 0 0 0:8 1  0:00034
Shocks assumed to be both monetary and productivity each with standard error of 0.01.
Table 7: Optimal index weighting scheme under ination and price level targeting with full current
information assumption
We note that:
(1) lagged indexation does not have any weight in the optimal indexation scheme.
(2) monetary policy is e¤ective on welfare; as we move from ination to price targeting and then to
stricter price targeting expected welfare improves.
(3) the extent of price indexation also responds endogenously to this change in monetary policy: it
drops somewhat. While full rational indexation is best under ination targeting, price indexation drops
to only 80% (though still on the rational index) as price level targeting is introduced.
Let us consider these points in turn.
(1) To understand why lagged indexation does not enter the optimal indexation scheme, we refer back
to our earlier paper where we showed that lagged indexation created an additional correlation between
lagged price surprises and lagged prices: this tends to raise the variability of accumulated reset prices on
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balance. Hence the optimal indexation scheme only has rational indexation in it. The explanation can
be briey described as follows: the reset price under lagged indexation is given as the reset price under
rational indexation plus an extra term
logP t (lagged) = logP

t (rational) 

t 1   t 2
1  

(28)
where vt 1 = logPt 1   Et 1 logPt. The reset price under the rational expectation is only a func-
tion of the current and lagged productivity shocks. The term  

t 1 t 2
1 

in the reset price un-
der lagged indexation contains all past productivity and monetary shocks. The di¤erence between
expected welfare under rational indexation and lagged indexation is divided into two parts. The rst
part consists all the terms (q) that are not related to lagged productivity shock (zt 1), such as all
the productivity shocks that occur before or at period (t  2) and all monetary shocks. These shocks
are the ones that do not enter the reset price expression under rational indexation. The expected
welfare of this part is  p 1+

1 
1 

var (q) 4 which must worsen the expected welfare under lagged in-
dexation compared with rational indexation. The second part of the expected welfare consists only
of terms in zt 1 which are hence correlated with welfare under rational indexation. This part is
 p 1+

002 + ( 0 + 
00)2 + (1  )00 ( 0 + 00)

var(z), which turns out for the calibrated values
of the model to improve expected welfare compared with rational indexation. In aggregate the compar-
ison between the resulted expected welfare levels under lagged and rational indexation depends on the
magnitudes of the two parts above. The simulation results suggest that the rst part dominates the
second, so that lagged indexation lowers expected welfare by introducing additional lagged shocks into
the reset price.
(2) Monetary policy is now e¤ective on expected welfare because full information causes current
monetary and productivity shocks to a¤ect both reset prices and wages and the interest rate rule modies
these e¤ects through its reaction coe¢ cients. We can demonstrate this conclusion in the analytic model
with its assumptions of no labour market, no capital accumulation, and only price setting. reset price.
This models solution for the reset price under full rational indexation is:
logP t = 1:5134zt   1:0141zt 1   1:4095t + 0:7659t 1 (29)
Here the monetary shock and its lagged value join the productivity shock and its lagged value in
a¤ecting the reset price and so expected welfare.
Moving from an ination to a price-level target has the e¤ect of increasing the response of real
interest rates to price shocks and so dampening these. The reason is that price-level targeting e¤ectively
raises the real interest rate, rt, response to a price shock because rt = Rt   Ett+1, which is rt =
rule  (EtPt+1   Pt). Under ination targeting, the last term in the real interest rate equation is small
or zero so the real interest, rt, is just the rule; but under price-level targeting, EtPt+1 is small or zero, so
the rule becomes rule+Pt: Therefore, a price-level target stops prices moving as much as they do under
an ination target. This reduces the variance of the reset price and also that of both of the real wage
and of employment which additionally enter the welfare function in the full model. We can see the e¤ect
of the reduced reset price variance from simulations of the analytic model under full current information
and full rational indexation - Table (8) below
Ination target Price target
Productivity Monetary Total Productivity Monetary Total
 0:001363  0:001026  0:002389  0:00087  0:000498  0:00137
Table 8: Expected welfare for rational indexation under interest rule with ination and price level targets,
assuming full current information (stochastic simulation of monetary and productitivty shocks, each with
standard error of 0.01)
(3) We turn last to why indexation is sensitive to monetary policy. We can understand this in terms
of the alteration less than full rational indexation creates in the reset price, pt : Using the reset price
equation which under full rational indexation can be written as function of unexpected current and
lagged price changes (Le and Minford, 2006, equation (49)):
(1  ) logP t = logPUEt    logPUEt 1 ; (30)
4 qt i = i jqt j
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If we now deviate from full rational indexation by reducing the indexation to (1   k) this gives us
instead
(1  ) logP t = logPUEt + kEt 1 logPt    logPUEt 1   kEt 2 logPt 1; (31)
We can see that this creates a potential correlation between Et 1 logPtand logPUEt 1 : Suppose there
is a shock to the price level, then under price-level targeting there is a commitment to remove some or
all of this shock from next periods price level; thus write Et 1 logPt = (1   ) logPUEt 1 where  is
the model-generated persistence in prices and  is the extent of its removal by the price-targeting rule.
It follows that the variance of logP t which enters expected welfare will equal (
1
1  )
2[V ar logPUE ](1 +
[k(1   )]2 + f2 + [k(1   )]2   2k(1   )g). The di¤erence of this from the variance at k = 0
is ( 11  )
2[V ar logPUE ]([k(1   )]2 + [k(1   )]2   2k(1   )): For this di¤erence to be negative
for positive {k; (1  )g we require that 2 > (1  )(1 + k2): Price-level targeting generates a value
of  close to unity, hence reducing the right hand side to close to zero- the stricter the closer to zero.
However, ination-targeting tends to induce a positive serial correlation, , between rates of ination;
thus the serial correlation between price levels is 1 +  = (1  ) here.
So what we nd is that Calvo persistence produces a reason to bias indexation away from full in
order to induce a helpful correlation o¤setting the persistence. Nevertheless it remains optimal to use
rational indexation in preference to lagged, essentially because the latter introduces unnecessary extra
correlations which tend to raise the variance of logP t :
What are the impulse responses to a monetary shock under the three monetary regimes we have
identied? The charts show them in turn for ination targeting, price targeting and stricter price
targeting, the latter two with endogenously slightly lower than full (rational) indexation. What we see
is that they have none of the supposed hallmark properties of New Keynesian models: there is little
persistence, no hump shape in either ination or output, but rather there is a brief moving shock
oscillation followed by virtually no residual e¤ect at all. Price level targeting increases stability, the
stricter the greater the increase. As for the productivity shock (gure ??) we see a rather similar e¤ect
to that of a monetary shock superimposed on the steady declining e¤ect of declining productivity on
output and consumption. There is plainly no nominal rigidity to speak of in these e¤ects; there is solely
an e¤ect of the Calvo mechanism causing relative prices to move in response to both shocks because
only a minority of price and wage setters are able to change their relative price currently in response to
a current shock.
4 CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Calvo contract adjusted for rationally expected indexation under both monetary
regimes - ination and price level targeting- delivers the highest expected welfare. This holds under both
information assumptions though under full information price-level targeting tends to induce slightly
less than full indexation because price shocks are less persistent. Rational indexation eliminates the
e¤ectiveness of monetary policy on welfare when there is only price-setting under only current micro
information. However in the broader context of wage-setting and full current information, both of which
are standard in New Keynesian models, monetary policy regains e¤ectiveness; and the class of interest
rate rules that delivers the highest benets are those which target the price level as strictly as possible,
the reason being that this policy minimises the size of shocks to prices and hence of wage and price
dispersion. However rational indexation even when less than full ensures that there is very little nominal
rigidity in this adapted world of Calvo contracts. It may be replied that in this case Calvo contracts
lose their empirical attractiveness, implying that rational indexation should not be adopted for empirical
reasons. This may or may not be the case and should be the subject of further work- initial indications
are that models with little nominal rigidity may perform rather better empirically than has been realised.
The key points we are trying to make in this paper are rst that there is a strong theoretical case for such
indexing; second that its e¤ect is to deprive New Keynesian models of their central supposed features;
and third that it strengthens the case for price level targeting.
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Figure 1: Dynamic paths after an unexpected 0.01 rise in interest rate under di¤erent monetary regimes
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Figure 2: Dynamic paths after an unexpected 0.01 rise in productivity under di¤erent monetary regimes
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5 APPENDIX
5.1 Non-linear model
Consumption
Ct =
1
Ptt
(A1)
Capital constraint
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It   1
2
 

It
Kt 1
  
2
Kt 1 (A2)
Rt
Wt
=

1  
Nt(f)
Kt 1(f)
(A3)
Marginal cost
MCt =
1
(1  )(1 )
RtW
1 
t
Zt
(A4)
tPt = t   t 

It
Kt 1
  

(A5)
t = Et
(
t+1Rt+1 + t+1
 
[1  ]  1
2
 

It+1
Kt
  
2
+  

It+1
Kt
  

It+1
Kt
!)
, (A6)
Indexation formulas for:
Price ePt = (0Pt 1 + (1  0)Et 1 logPt)00 (32)
Wage fWt = (!0Wt 1 + (1  !0)Et 1 logWt)!00
Price setting behaviour:
P t = p
PBt
PAt
, (A7)
PBt = EtPBt+1 + j
MCt
Pt

PtePt
p+1 ePtYt (A8)
PAt = EtPAt+1 + t

PtePt
p ePtYt (A9)
Aggregate price

Pt
Pt 1
1 p
= (1  )
 
P t ePt
Pt 1
!(1 p)
+ 
 ePtePt 1
!1 p
(A10)
Aggregate output
Yt =
ZtK

t 1N
1 
t
DPt
(A11)
Price dispersion
DPt = (1  )

Pt
P t (f) ~Pt
p
+ 

Pt
Pt 1
p  ~Pt
~Pt 1
! p
DPt 1 (A12)
Market clearing condition
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (A13)
Wage setting behaviour
W
(1+w)
t = w
WBt
WAt
(A14)
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WBt = !EtWBt+1 +N
1+
t

WtfWt
w(1+)
(A15)
WAt = !EtWAt+1 + t ePtNtWtfWt
w
(A17)
Aggregate wage 
WtfWt
1 w
= (1  !)W (1 w)t + !
 
Wt 1fWt 1
!1 w
(A18)
Welfare
Ut = Et
1X
=t
 t

logCt   1
(1 + )
AL

, (A19)
Average disutility of work
ALt = N
1+
t DWt (A20)
Wage dispersion
DWt = (1  !)
 
W t (h)fWt
Wt
! w(1+)
+ !

Wt 1
Wt
 w(1+) fWt
fWt 1
! w(1+)
DWt 1 (A21)
Euler equation
Et
t+1
t
= Ett;t+1 =
1
1 + i
(A22)
Monetary policy
it = 0:222 + 0:82it 1 + 0:35552t + 0:032384 (output gap)t + "i;t, (A23)
or
it = 0:222 + 0:82it 1 + 0:35552 logPt + 0:032384 (output gap)t + "i;t, (A24)
Following Canzoneri et al (2004) we dene the output gap as the log deviation of output from its
steady state level.
5.2 Ination targeting rule under restricted information assumption
5.2.1 Equation
Equation (12) is rewritten as
logPt   k0 (1  k1)Et 1 logPt   (k0k1 + ) logPt 1 + k0 (1  k1)Et 2 logPt 1 + k0k1 logPt 2
=
(1  ) (1  )  B 1   1 logZt
(1  EtB 1) (1  EtB 1)  
(1  ) (1  )Et 1 logMt
(1  Et 1B 1) (1  Et 1B 1)  
  (1  ) (1  )

    1  B 1+ k0 (1  k1)  1  Et 1B 1Et 1 logPt
(1  Et 1B 1) (1  Et 1B 1)
+
(1  ) (1  )    k0k1  1  Et 1B 1 logPt 1
(1  Et 1B 1) (1  Et 1B 1) (33)
where 1+1  = 
:
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5.2.2 LHS of equation
Take all the price related variables to the RHS of this equation, we get the equation (??) in the text.
The RHS of the latter equation is in the text, and assuming 1 = 2; the derivation of the LHS is as
following:
(1  ) (1  )
 
Et(1 B 1) (  logZt)
 
1  Et 1B 1 (1  Et 1B 1)
(1  EtB 1) (1  EtB 1)   E
t 1 logMt
!
= (1  ) (1  )
 
(1   1)
 
1  Et 1B 1 (1  Et 1B 1) logZt
(1  1) (1  1)
  2 logMt 1
!
=
(1  ) (1  )
(1  1) (1  1)

(1   1)
 
1  Et 1B 1   Et 1B 1 + Et 1B 2 logZt
 2 (1  1) (1  1) logMt 1

= 

(1   1)
 
1  Et 1B 1   Et 1B 1 + Et 1B 2 logZt
 2 (1  1) (1  1) logMt 1

= 

(1   1)
 
logZt   ( + ) 21 logZt 1 + 31 logZt 1

 2 (1  1) (1  1) logMt 1

= 
"
(1   1)

zt
1 1L   
2
1 ( + 
   1) zt 11 1L

 2 (1  1) (1  1) t 11 1L
#
(34)
5.2.3 Collect unknown coe¢ cients
Multiplying both RHS and LHS by (1  1L) ; we get equation (13) in the text. Given that logPt =
1i=0"izt i +
1
i=0&it i; we determine the unknown coe¢ cients on t i as follows
(t)
&0 = 0 (35) 
t 1

0:564 (1  k0 + k0k1) "3 + ( 1:8 + 1:42k0   1:98k0k1) "2+
(2:8945  0:8889k0 + 2:69k0k1) "1   (2:5847 + 1:9028k0k1) "0 =  0:0933 (36) 
t 2

0:564 (1  k0 + k0k1) &4   (2:321  2:322k0 + 2:881k0k1) &3
+(4:5549  3:2089k0 + 5:532k0k1) &2
+( 4:3347 + 1:4915k0   5:0556k0k1) &1 + (1:534 + 2:43k0k1) &0 = 0
(37)
 
t i; i  3

0:564 (1  k0 + k0k1) &i+2   (2:321  2:322k0 + 2:881k0k1) &i+1
+(4:5549  3:56k0 + 5:883k0k1) &i   (4:3347  2:4275k0 + 6k0k1) &i 1
+(1:534  0:62k0 + 3:05k0k1) &i 2   0:62k0k1&i 3 = 0
(38)
5.3 Solution for logP t under Rational indexation
It is a brief description of solution for logP t ; for the details, see Le and Minford (ibid.). From the
equations (9) and the assumption of rational expectation, the reset price is
logP t = E
t 1 logP t + logP
UE
t = logP
UE
t  

1   logP
UE
t 1 (39)
where
logPUEt = (1  ) logP UEt (40)
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and from equation of the general price level and the assumption that rms have knowledge of their own
micro information in period t as well as the macro information of period (t  1) :
logP UEt = logP

t   Et 1 logP t
= (1  ) i=0 ()i

1 + 
1  

Et 1 log Yt+i   Et logZt+i

  (1  ) i=0 ()i

1 + 
1  

Et 1 log Yt+i   Et 1 logZt+i

= (1  )

1 + 
1  

1
1  1
( zt) (41)
Hence the renewed price is rewritten as
logP t = logP
UE
t    logP UEt 1 = 0
(1  L)
(1  ) ( zt) ; (42)
And the expected welfare under the rational indexation for prices is
E(ut   uFLEXt ) =  p
002var(z) (43)
This solution is identical under two monetary policy rules, that targets ination and price level.
5.4 General Solution for logP t
From equation (9)
logP t =
1
1  
h
logPt   log ~Pt   

logPt 1   log ~Pt 1
i
=
1
1  

logPt   k0
 
Et 1 logPt + k1
 
logPt 1   Et 1 logPt

  logPt 1   k0  Et 2 logPt 1 + k1  logPt 2   Et 2 logPt 1

=
1
1  

logPt   k0
 
Et 1 logPt + k1vt 1

  logPt 1   k0  Et 2 logPt 1 + k1vt 2

=
1
1  

Et 1 logPt + logPUEt   
 
Et 2 logPt 1 + logPUEt 1

 k0Et 1 logPt   k0k1vt 1 + k0Et 2 logPt 1 + k0k1vt 2

(44)
where logPUEt = (1  ) (1  )

1+
1 

1
1 1 ( zt) =  
0zt: and it does not depend on any
monetary shocks.
Therefore, consider only productivity shocks, equation (44) can be rewritten as
logP t (zt i) =
1
1  

[ 0zt + 0zt 1] + (1  k0)Et 1 logPt    (1  k0)Et 2 logPt 1
 k0k1vt 1 ++k0k1vt 2

(45)
given that the term 11  [ 0zt + 0zt 1] is equal to logP t under rational indexation. This equation
in term can be written using Wold decomposition:
logP t (zt i) =
1
1  

[ 0zt + 0zt 1] + (1  k0)Et 1 logPt    (1  k0)Et 2 logPt 1
 k0k1
 
logPt 1   Et 1 logPt

+ k0k1
 
logPt 2   Et 2 logPt 1
 
=
1
1  

[ 0zt + 0zt 1] + (1  k0) 1i=1"izt i    (1  k0)1i=2 "i 1zt i
 k0k1 (1i=1"i 1zt i   1i=1"izt i) + k0k1 (1i=2"i 2zt i   1i=2"i 1zt i)

=
 0zt + 0zt 1
1   +
 k0k1 ("0   "1) + (1  k0) "1
1   zt 1 +
"2 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  "1 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1"0
1   zt 2 +
"3 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  "2 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1"1
1   zt 3 + ::: (46)
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Assume that there are only monetary shocks t i; then equation (44) is
logP t
 
t i

=
1
1  

(1  k0)Et 1 logPt    (1  k0)Et 2 logPt 1
 k0k1
 
logPt 1   Et 1 logPt

+ k0k1
 
logPt 2   Et 2 logPt 1
 
=
1
1  

(1  k0) 1i=1&izt i   k0k1 (1i=1&i 1zt i   1i=1&izt i)
+k0k1 (
1
i=2&i 2zt i   1i=2&i 1zt i)   (1  k0) 1i=1&izt i

=
 k0k1 (&0   &1) + (1  k0) &1
1   zt 1 +
&2 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  &1 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1&0
1   zt 2 +
&3 (k0k1 + (1  k0))  &2 (k0k1 (1 + ) +  (1  k0)) + k0k1&1
1   zt 3 + ::: (47)
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